Abstract: This Article examines how a U.S. debt default might occur, how it could be avoided, its potential consequences if not avoided, and how those consequences could be mitigated. The most realistic default would result from rollover risk: the risk that the government will be temporarily unable to borrow sufficient funds to repay its maturing debt.
INTRODUCTION Although many would agree that "an eventual default [by the United
States government] on [its] Treasury debt [is] a conceivable, although unlikely, outcome," concern is growing.
1 When the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury met recently with a group of Chinese students, they laughed contemptuously at the and causing securities markets to plummet. 13 A U.S. debt default also would raise a host of legal issues, including questions of first impression under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. 14 Finally, Part IV explores how the negative consequences of a default might be mitigated, potentially through bilateral or unilateral debt restructuring or even through a possible International Monetary Fund (IMF) bailout. 15 The Article concludes, however, that neither a debt restructuring nor an IMF bailout would likely be successful in effectively mitigating those consequences. It therefore may be more prudent to try to minimize rollover risk ab initio, such as by better managing the issuance of short-term government debt and considering austerity measures that would reasonably limit the government's need to borrow.
I. HOW MIGHT THE UNITED STATES DEFAULT ON ITS NATIONAL DEBT?
The classic view is that a national debt default, meaning a "hard default" on the debt, which includes non-payment of debt when due, ultimately depends on the country's expenditures exceeding taxes and new borrowings. 16 That view, however, does not adequately differentiate between insolvency and illiquidity. Insolvency occurs when total liabilities exceed the value of total assets, whereas illiquidity occurs when liquid assets-for example, cash, short-term securities, and other assets readily convertible to cash-are insufficient to pay current liabilities as they become due. 17 It is possible for a nation to be solvent but illiquid, causing the nation to default on its debt.
18 13 See infra notes 175-194 and accompanying text (discussing the economic consequences of a default).
14 See infra notes 114-174 and accompanying text (discussing possible legal consequences of a U.S. default). 15 See infra notes 195-232 and accompanying text. 16 See Richard H. Herring, Default and the International Role of the Dollar, in IS U.S. GOV-ERNMENT DEBT DIFFERENT?, supra note 1, at 21, 21 (also using the term "hard default" to describe a distressed exchange offer); Howell E. Jackson, The 2011 Debt Ceiling Impasse Revisited, in IS U.S. GOVERNMENT DEBT DIFFERENT?, supra note 1, at 55, 58-59. 17 This Article assumes that the United States is unlikely to become insolvent soon. 19 Nonetheless, there is a real risk that the United States could become illiquid. 20 The most likely cause of illiquidity is rollover risk: the government's temporary inability to borrow sufficient funds to repay or refinance its maturing debt. 21 
A. Rollover Risk and Illiquidity
Rollover risk is not merely theoretical. A former Under Secretary of the Treasury for Domestic Finance recently observed that "[i]f you ask [U.S.] Treasury . . . officials responsible for debt management 'What keeps you up at night?' the only candid reply will be: the risk of not being able to roll[]over their debt at the next auction. In practice, debt sustainability is about rollover risk . . . ." 22 This mirrors one of the author's earliest experiences practicing law. New York's Monroe County had short-term revenue-anticipation notes coming due. As it had done many times in the past, the county-which was financially solvent-offered new notes for sale at public auction, intending to use the proceeds to repay the maturing notes. Unfortunately, because of feared contagion from what was then New York City's financial crisis, 23 nobody showed up to buy the new notes.
Though seemingly less dramatic than insolvency, a U.S. debt default caused by rollover risk could seriously undermine the perception of U.S. gov- 19 
But see Satyajit Das, "We Interrupt Regular Programming to Announce That the United
States of America Has Defaulted," ECONOMONITOR (Nov. 11, 2008), http://www.economonitor. com/blog/2008/11/we-interrupt-regular-programming-to-announce-that-the-united-states-of-americahas-defaulted/, archived at http://perma.cc/0u2L9S4KWnN (quoting the head of global investment for South Korea's National Pension Fund, Kwag Dae Hwan, as stating that "[a] big question mark hangs over whether the US can deal with an unprecedented amount of debt. That is unnerving all the investors, including me."). 20 See Nouriel Roubini, Liquidity/Rollover Risk on US Assets? A Nightmare Hard Landing Scenario for the US $ and US Bond Market, ECONOMONITOR (Dec. 21, 2004), http://www.economonitor.com/ nouriel/2004/12/21/liquidityrollover-risk-on-us-assets-a-nightmare-hard-landing-scenario-for-the-usand-the-us-bond-market/, archived at http://perma.cc/0pzwZqEYeHE (explaining that there is a real risk of a liquidity crisis in the United States). 21 ernment creditworthiness. 24 That, in turn, could create a devastating feedback loop: the reduced perception of creditworthiness could prevent the nation from borrowing sufficient new money needed to repay future maturing debt-or, at least, increase the cost of that borrowing-thereby further increasing rollover risk and triggering additional defaults and an even larger debt crisis. 25 Because rollover risk is such a concern, one might ask why governments, including the United States, routinely depend on borrowing new money to repay their maturing debt. The answer is cost: using short-term debt to fund long-term projects is attractive because, if managed to avoid a default, it tends to lower the cost of borrowing. 26 The interest rate on short-term debt is usually lower than that on long-term debt because, other things being equal, it is easier to assess a borrower's ability to repay in the short term than in the long term, and long-term debt carries greater interest-rate risk. 27 As Monroe County learned, however, this cost-saving does not come free of charge: it also introduces the threat of rollover risk.
28
Rollover risk effectively arises any time short-term debt is used to fund long-term projects. 29 Until the project is completed, its revenues may be unavailable to repay the short-term debt; thus, the main source of repayment of the short-term debt during the project term is the proceeds of newly issued short-term debt. 30 The shorter the term of the debt, the more often it will mature and be repayable during the project term, with each maturity presenting a separate rollover risk. 31 With the rise of the so-called "shadow banking" sys- 24 Enrica Detragiache, Rational Liquidity Crises in the Sovereign Debt Market: In Search of a Theory, 43 IMF STAFF PAPERS 545, 546 (1996) . 25 Id.; see infra notes 186-189 and accompanying text (explaining why even a mere "technical" debt default could harm the real economy). 26 Roubini, supra note 20 (explaining that the maturity length of treasury debt has decreased significantly since the 1990s because it is much less expensive to finance short-term debt than longer-term debt). 27 Id. 28 See id. (explaining that the average rate of maturity for U.S. government bonds has fallen sharply since the 1990s and explaining how this contributes to increasing rollover risk). 29 See Viral Acharya et al., Rollover Risk and Market Freezes, 66 J. FIN. 1177, 1179 (2011) (providing examples of short-term projects that were financed with short-term debt during the 2007-2008 financial crisis). Economists sometimes refer to the use of short-term debt to fund long-term projects as a form of maturity transformation or as an asset-liability mismatch. See id. at 1177. 30 See Brunnermeier, supra note 21, at 91-92 (explaining rollover risk). A similar risk occurs in a financial market where there is a growing reliance on short-term repo contracts, in which a firm raises capital by selling an asset one day with the promise to repurchase it on a future date at a higher price. Id. at 80 (explaining that there is an increasing reliance by investment banks on such "overnight financing"). 31 See Roubini, supra note 20 (explaining rollover risk and how the average length of U.S. debt has decreased rapidly in the last decade).
tem-a system of financing outside of traditional banking channels-rollover risk is becoming increasingly common, even outside of government finance.
B. Rollover Risk's Application to U.S. Debt
The U.S. government relies heavily on short-term debt funding. 33 As a result, some estimates suggest that the U.S. government has to roll over half of its debt every two years. 34 A recent article estimates that the U.S. government will have to roll over seventy-one percent of its privately held debt over the next five years. 35 Additionally, the government depends on short-term debt to finance the federal budget deficit-which was $1.1 trillion in 2012.
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So long as the United States maintains a large deficit funded by the issuance of short-term debt, it creates a risk of being unable to raise the funding necessary to avoid default. 37 32 See Acharya et al., supra note 29, at 1179 (explaining how rollover risk contributed to the failure of Bear-Stearns, a global investment bank, in March 2008). Because shadow banking allows for financing outside of traditional banking channels, it also avoids the need for traditional modes of bank intermediation between capital markets and the users of funds. Brunnermeier, supra note 21, at 79; see Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo, 104 J. FIN. ECON. 425, 425 (2012) (using the term "securitized banking system" rather than "shadow banking system"). It includes, for example, asset-backed commercial paper ("ABCP") conduits and structured investment vehicles ("SIVs"), which routinely issue short-term commercial paper to invest in financial assets having long-term maturities. Brunnermeier, supra note 21, at 79. Rollover risk is also present in the practice of repo lending, whereby one party purports to sell a financial asset (typically a security) to another party and promises to "repurchase" the asset at a later time. Policy responses to the expanding shadow-banking system might also increase government rollover risk. A senior advisor to the U.S. Treasury recently argued, for example, that the financial crisis revealed a problem of "excessive private money-creation in response to an insufficient supply of [U.S.] Treasury bills." 38 In other words, investors demanded shadow-banking investments as a comparable short-term financing option because of a shortage of Treasury bills. A "simple solution to this problem," this senior advisor contended, would be to "increase the supply of Treasury bills."
39 Such a solution would attract funding away from risky investments and into U.S. debt securities. 40 The downside, however, is that issuing more Treasury bills would create more "rollover risk[] from the system migrating from the (shadow) banking system to the balance sheet of the [United States]." 41 Ongoing political disputes over the federal debt ceiling further exacerbate rollover risk by limiting the amount of new debt that can be issued to repay maturing debt. 42 Prior to 1939, Congress-which under the Constitution has the authority "to borrow money on the credit of the United States" Oct. 5, 2013 , at A1 (demonstrating that political disputes might lead to questions as to whether Congress will cooperate to raise the debt ceiling in time to avoid a default). This assumes, of course, that enough other debt was issued since the maturing debt was issued so that the federal debt limit would be faced. Even given that assumption, however, I would argue that additional new debt should be issued if its proceeds to "simultaneously" repay the maturing debt, because-repayment and interest cost aside-that issuance would not create a net increase in outstanding debt.
43 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2.
U.S. Treasury, which was then delegated limited congressional authority to manage the issuance of national debt.
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At first blush, the federal debt ceiling does not seem especially problematic because it is artificial and can be raised by Congress to avoid default. 45 In fact, Congress has modified the debt ceiling over ninety times since 1940, 46 and at least ten times since 2001. 47 History reveals, however, that not all of these modifications are passed in a timely manner. Most notably, on April 26, 1979 the federal debt ceiling prevented the U.S. government from borrowing sufficient funds to repay its maturing debt, thereby triggering a default. 48 The government also defaulted on its debt coming due on May 3rd and 10th of that year, in part due to the debt ceiling. 49 On several other occasions, the failure to timely modify the federal debt ceiling pushed the government close to default, adding to the uncertainty that the government will in fact repay its short-term commitments. 54 and appear to be the result of fundamental disagreements over the federal government's size and role. 55 A debt ceiling "crisis" occurred in 2011, for example, when certain members of Congress attempted to use the debt ceiling to force the Obama administration to accept spending cuts. 56 Even more recently, in 2013, the Republican majority in Congress conditioned any raise in the debt ceiling on spending "cuts and reforms."
57 As a result, Congress was able to reach a debt ceiling agreement only on the eve of a default, creating speculation that the United States might actually default on some of its debt. 58 As long as these types of fundamental disagreements exist, members of Congress may well continue to "play[] politics" with the debt ceiling and push the nation, at times, uncomfortably close to default.
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II. HOW COULD A U.S. DEBT DEFAULT BE AVOIDED?
Because rollover risk makes a U.S. debt default more likely, the government should pay greater attention to managing that risk. As a senior advisor to the U.S. Treasury observed, " [p] 
A. Monetizing the Debt
One route to minimizing rollover risk would be through monetizing the country's debt. "Monetizing" the debt is a somewhat vague term, referring to monetary steps-including quantitative easing and printing money-that the government can take for the sole purpose of facilitating its debt payment. 62 This is in contrast to monetary steps taken for other purposes, such as achieving price stability or maximizing economic growth. 
Quantitative Easing
Quantitative easing ("QE") is the most popular way to monetize government debt, and indeed the terms "monetizing the debt" and "QE" are often used interchangeably.
64 QE is generally defined as a policy that, unconventionally, increases the monetary base with the goals of reducing the cost of government debt and increasing liquidity. 65 Typically, a central bank engages in QE by instituting a lending program or purchasing financial assets, including government securities. 66 In the Unit- 61 Id. One may query how that mandate would parse with the Federal Reserve's "dual mandate" to "promote effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable prices and moderate long-term interest rates." Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. § 225a (2012). Furthermore, it may be difficult to reach an optimal tradeoff between rollover risk and interest-rate cost on government debt. Cf. E-mail from Deborah J. Lucas, Sloan Distinguished Professor of Fin., Mass. Inst. of Tech., to author (Aug. 28, 2013) (on file with author) (observing that "it is difficult to specify what the tradeoff function between higher rates and liquidity benefits should be"). . 64 See Andolfatto & Li, supra note 63, at 1 (using the term "monetizing the debt" to describe quantitative easing). 65 67 The Fed pays for these securities with reserves it creates "by a stroke of the pen," 68 which some consider the "effective equivalent of money printing." 69 This process reduces the government's cost of borrowing: although the Treasury continues to pay interest to the Fed on its debt, the Treasury will not have to repay the principal as it would to an outside investor. 70 QE also increases U.S. government liquidity. 71 , http://www.forbes.com/sites/afont evecchia/2013/05/08/u-s-is-insolvent-banks-sitting-on-trillions-in-derivatives-we-cant-see-and-qemoney-printing-is-making-it-worse-singer-at-ira-sohn/, archived at http://perma.cc/0QEfh8zyzZQ; see Eisenbeis, supra note 68. Simplistically, QE can be viewed as the Fed issuing Federal Reserve liabilities in exchange for Treasury debt, thereby effectively moving sovereign debt from the Treasury's balance sheet to that of the Fed. Eisenbeis, supra note 68 ("Looking at the Fed's portfolio of securities from the perspective of the nation's consolidated balance sheet, we see that one form of government debt (Treasury debt) is taken out of circulation and replaced with another form of government debt (Federal Reserve liabilities)."). 70 See QE, or Not QE?, ECONOMIST, July 14, 2012, at 66, 66 (explaining QE). By purchasing Treasury securities, some argue that the Fed also gives the appearance of increasing investor demand for those securities without real money being paid, which in turn drives down the government's cost of borrowing by lowering the interest rate payable on Treasury securities. See id. 71 See da Costa, supra note 68. QE increases government liquidity by taking U.S. government debt out of circulation and replacing it with Federal Reserve liabilities that do not necessarily have to be paid. See id. When the Fed purchases U.S. Treasury securities, the debt evidenced by those securities is taken out of circulation and "effectively retired." Id. The Treasury continues, however, to pay the Fed interest, from which the Fed extracts its expenses and dividend payments and returns the remainder to the Treasury. The counterargument, however, is that because the Fed's QE operations are disclosed, the market should not falsely perceive investor demand. 73 See supra note 69 and accompanying text (explaining that like printing money, QE increases the amount of currency in circulation). 74 Herring, supra note 16, at 22 (explaining that "[governments] can almost always print enough domestic currency to service their debts in a timely manner"); see also Catherine New, Could the U.S. Print Its Way Out of the Debt Crisis?, DAILYFINANCE (July 28, 2011, 5:00 PM), http://www.dailyfinance.com/2011/07/28/could-the-u-s-print-its-way-out-of-the-debt-crisis/, archived at http://perma.cc/0msBSkYVpgX (explaining how printing money could enable the United States to repay its debt but also highlighting the risk of inflation that could accompany this solution).
has the flexibility generally to monetize its debt-because the U.S. dollar is a major reserve currency, and is therefore in high demand. 75 Just as with QE and other forms of monetizing its debt, the U.S. government would face negative consequences, such as inflation, that would result from printing money to pay its debt. Inflation can also motivate investors to demand higher interest rates, which would "balloon the cost of servicing the federal debt." 76 The former president of the Kansas City Federal Reserve has even argued that the inflation resulting from printing money to pay U.S. debt could threaten American living standards as well as destroy the Fed's independence and credibility. 77 Moreover, the government's flexibility to print money or otherwise monetize its debt to avoid default could change. 78 The U.S. dollar could, for example, lose its role as the international reserve currency, thereby making it harder, or at least more inflationary, to sell dollars. 79 Reserve currencies have been displaced before. The pound sterling was the world's first major reserve currency, but the U.S. dollar began to dominate after World War I. 80 Since the U.S. dollar's rise, several countries have attempted to replace it with their 75 Herring, supra note 16, at 25-28 (discussing the role of the dollar in the international economy). Because the U.S. dollar is the benchmark for world prices and is used to settle cross-border trades, there is a unique demand for dollars: countries need to keep stores of dollar reserves, both as a float and to bolster confidence in their own currencies. Climbing Greenback Mountain, ECONOMIST, Sept. 24, 2011, at 12, 13. , at WK1 (discussing other negative consequences of inflation, including a declining dollar resulting in more expensive imported goods and demand for increased interest rates among foreign borrowers, which will prompt increased interest rates for home and automobile buyers, and business and credit card holders). But cf. Herring, supra note 16, at 22 (explaining that increasing inflation can make it easier for the government, as debtor, to repay debt that has fixed principal and interest). 77 Hill, supra note 76 (quoting Thomas Hoenig). 78 See Herring, supra note 16, at 25-28 (explaining that the dollar is currently used as reserve currency but that this could change). 79 See id. at 28-29 (describing the threats to the dollar's status as the leading reserve currency). In theory, any nation can monetize its debt-or at least debt payable in the nation's currency-by printing money, but doing so necessarily increases the money supply and so causes inflation. Id. at 22-23 (explaining that countries that are especially adverse to inflation might prefer a default rather than the inflation that would be triggered by printing money). If the currency is a major reserve currency-as the U.S. dollar currently is-the natural supply of that currency would be larger than the supply of a non-major reserve currency. See id. at 25 (explaining that the United States enjoys an "extra degree of freedom" in its ability to print money "because of the international role of the dollar"). Therefore, the inflationary effect caused by printing the money needed to pay the nation's debt would be smaller than if the nation did not have a major reserve currency. See id. 80 Id. at 26.
currency: Japan and the euro zone of the European Union both have hoped their respective currencies might serve as the principal reserve currency.
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In the future, the Chinese renminbi (also called yuan) may pose a real threat to the U.S. dollar's status. The Chinese government has already taken steps towards enhancing the renminbi's international role, giving most companies the right to pay for imports in renminbi and allowing many companies to sell exports for renminbi. 82 To replace the U.S. dollar, however, China would have to abandon many of its current policies, like artificially setting the renminbi exchange rate.
B. Asset Sales
The U.S. government could also consider selling assets as part of its debt-reduction measures. This could even include the "monetization" of future tax revenues or quasi-production payments of mineral rights.
84 Some experts argue, for example, that "[s]overeigns can almost always sell sufficient assets to service their debts." 85 That assumes, of course, that those sales could be made on a timely enough basis to pay maturing debt, which may not always be possible. As part of its proposed bailout, for example, Greece was required to sell assets to raise funds in accordance with specified deadlines. 86 But as of June 2013, Greece was still struggling to attract buyers for assets like its natural gas company and its grid-operating subsidiary. 87 greece-funding-idUSL5N0F13HX20130625, archived at http://perma.cc/7DNB-23JT (discussing Greece's difficultly in securing buyers for national assets, such as its national gas company); Christos Ziotis, Greek Asset-Sales Plan Dealt Blow as Gazprom Declines Depa Bid, BLOOMBERG (June 10, 2013, 12:29 PM), http://www.bloom berg.com/news/2013-06-10/greek-asset-sales-plan-dealt-blow-as-gazprom-declines-depa-bid.html, archived at http://perma.cc/0XPfL7vmeUY (discussing Greece's difficulty in securing buyers for its grid operating company, Desfa SA and its gas monopoly, Depa SA). progress "extremely disappointing," 88 as Greece has been able to raise only a fraction of its target from the sale of government assets since 2010.
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The United States may face similar problems if it attempts to raise funds quickly through asset sales; it may be difficult to attract sufficient investors, and increasing the supply of (non-unique) assets relative to a fixed demand will likely decrease the return on assets sold. 90 In addition to these difficulties, asset sales may well be politically unpopular, like "mortgaging the future."
C. Limits on Avoiding Default
Notwithstanding all this flexibility, there are additional limits on the ability to avoid a U.S. national debt default. These limits include the possibility that the magnitude of the problem could be too large for the United States to fix on its own. 91 A related possibility is that estimates about the size of the U.S. debt might understate the magnitude of the problem because those estimates fail to consider hidden liabilities. 1. The Problem Could Be Too Large An obvious limit is that the problem could simply be too large. A large increase in the size of government debt and the resulting magnitude of the problems posed by it could be triggered, for example, by a problem in the private sector that would require a massive U.S. government intervention to prevent a systemic collapse. 93 The Dodd-Frank Act, passed in 2010, attempts 88 Ziotis, supra note 87. 89 Harry Papachristou, Update 1-Greece PM Pleads for Some Slack in Latest EU/IMF Inspection, REUTERS (Sept. 18, 2013, 11:03 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/18/ greece-bailout-idUSL5N0HE2CT20130918, archived at http://perma.cc/Z53L-K2ZE (explaining that "Greece has clinched privatization deals worth 3.6 billion euros since its bailout started in 2010, compared with an initial target to raise 22 billion euros over that period"); Robin Wigglesworth & Kerin Hope, Greek Asset Sales Behind Target, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2012, 7:43 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/e91b970e-4b63-11e1-b980-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2YSsQUCgf, archived at http://perma.cc/PPS3-E7FZ (explaining that it has been difficult to attract investors to buy Greece's assets). 90 Millstein, supra note 84, at 162 ("However, states do not part with assets lightly, in particular with land and mineral rights. National pride in ownership can be a large obstacle, as can security and environmental concerns."). 91 See infra notes 93-101 and accompanying text (explaining that the size of the U.S. debt could rapidly increase). 92 See infra notes 102-110 and accompanying text (explaining the use of special purpose entities). 93 See Comment to Shortridge, supra note 62 (" [W] hat I see truly driving us over the 'real' cliff is the bond bubble bursting, spiking interest rates, and causing a massive crash in the deriva-to mitigate this risk. 94 It limits the Fed's ability to act as a lender of last resort, and it requires systemically important financial institutions to draw up "living wills" that specify how they could liquidate, if needed, with minimal systemic impact. 95 But in the author's experience as a bankruptcy lawyer, it is rare that a firm is able to accurately predict during good times what might happen during bad times. It therefore appears that the Fed will ultimately face the need to act as a lender of last resort at least in some cases. 96 Moreover, because it is possible that the Fed will eventually need to act as a lender of last resort, the Dodd-Frank Act's limitations on the Fed's ability to act in that capacity may well be "penny-wise but pound-foolish." A systemically important financial institution could end up defaulting, with systemic consequences, precisely because the Fed is unable to act as a lender of last resort. 97 The cost of trying to address those systemic consequences could itself "bankrupt" the country.
The Dodd-Frank Act also ignores the systemic implications of financial markets themselves. 98 In today's era of increasing disintermediation, financial markets can be triggers and transmitters of systemic risk. For example, the recent financial crisis was at least partly market driven. 99 Subprime mortgage loans had been bundled together as collateral to partially support the payment of mortgage-backed securities. 100 When home prices began falling, some of the mortgage-backed securities began defaulting or were downgraded, thereby destroying investor confidence in debt ratings and causing debt markets more broadly to collapse. 101 If financial markets collapse with systemic consequences, the cost of trying to address those consequences could, again, "bankrupt" the country.
Special-Purpose Entities and Hidden Debt
There is also an insidious problem of hidden debt. In the United States, both federal and state government is increasingly operated and financed through government-sponsored special-purpose entities ("SPEs"). 102 Originally, SPEs were used to bypass restrictions on government borrowing, such as debt limits and jurisdiction limitation; however, SPEs increasingly resemble those used by corporations as a tool to raise off-balance-sheet financing.
103 For example, some states establish "enterprises," which are funded by revenue bonds, "repayable solely from the profits of the enterprise."
104 Theoretically, the state allocates the risk of these enterprises failing to be profitable to investors without allowing "legal recourse to the state's general funds or tax revenues." 105 In the United States, the debt of government-sponsored SPEs is rarely disclosed as debt of the government because the government is not legally liable on that debt, either directly or as a guarantor.
106 Nonetheless, because a default by one of these entities could destroy the reputation and debt rating of its government sponsor, there are numerous precedents indicating that the government will routinely support its sponsored SPEs-even though it is not legally obligated to do so. 107 Indeed, the U.S. government stepped in to support the debt of its government-sponsored SPEs Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in the recent financial crisis, notwithstanding that such debt was not legally the government's obligation. 108 Id. at 382 (explaining that the U.S. government supported Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac's debt in order to enhance stability in the housing market). Other U.S. government-sponsored SPEs include, for example, the Tennessee Valley Authority ("TVA"), other "public benefit corporations," and "SPEs used to finance military aircraft." See Steven L. Schwarcz, Direct and Indirect U.S. Government Debt, in IS U.S. GOVERNMENT DEBT DIFFERENT?, supra note 1, at 245, 250-51. In the Housing and Economic Recovery Act, Congress endowed the newly formed Federal Housing Finance Agency ("FHFA") with a variety of mechanisms to strengthen the housing SPEs. See Housing and Economic Recovery Act, 12 U.S.C. § 4511 (2012) (giving the FHFA supervisory and Compounding this problem is the reality that if the United States had to step in to support the debt of its states, the amounts at issue could be huge. 109 Although state finances are generally improving, that improvement ignores the massive amounts of state SPE debt-which, in many states, is much larger than the state's general obligation debt. 110 If states have to step in to support their SPE debt, the federal government, in turn, may be forced to step in to support the states' debt to keep them from defaulting.
III. WHAT WOULD BE THE CONSEQUENCES OF A DEFAULT?
A U.S. debt default would have severe consequences. This Part examines both the legal and economic consequences of a default. First, Section A explains that a default could raise constitutional challenges, based on the Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution.
111 Notwithstanding those challenges, these legal claims would have to overcome several procedural hurdles such as sovereign immunity, the need to establish a remedy, and challenges enforcing a judgment. 112 It remains unclear, however, whether "question[ing]" the "validity" of U.S. debt would include defaulting on such debt.
118 Some argue that the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment should include that, and that it should even include governmental action that could lead to default. 119 Others argue, however, that a payment default should not be interpreted as questioning, or repudiating, the validity of U.S. debt. 120 One leading scholar explained the distinction: "Default is not the same as repudiation. If Congress repudiated the debt, it would be declaring that the debt is not owed. If Congress defaulted on the debt, the [debt] would still be owed; it would simply go (in part) unpaid."
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On the other hand, a prominent bankruptcy practitioner questions whether the distinction between validity and default is truly meaningful in the context of U.S. government debt: "Obligations of the sovereign can be en-forced only at the sovereign's own sufferance, so the validity of the debt and the debt's enforceability merge to become a single concept."
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Assuming that a payment default would violate the Fourteenth Amendment, what does that mean for the government's ability to default? If the government does not have money to pay the debt on a timely basis, the constitutionality of default might prove irrelevant. Where the government has no real choice but to violate the Constitution, it may arguably be "freed from constitutional constraint," at least where it did not create the problem leading to the default. 123 Of course, that begs the question of what constitutes a choice; for example, would the government's decision to default rather than to pay the debt by printing money-at the cost of inflation-be a real choice? 124 And if it were construed as a real choice, would a court then have the authority to order the government to print the money to avoid default? Would the government even have to comply with that order? These are unresolved questions.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on the constitutionality of state-government debt defaults might help inform the answers. In the midto-late 1800s, several states defaulted, renegotiated, or repudiated their debts despite arguably violating Section 10 of Article I of the Constitution (the "Contract Clause"), which prohibits states from passing any law "impairing the obligation of contracts." 125 Bondholders sued, resulting in a spate of cases that purport to turn on the doctrine of sovereign immunity-the principle that a sovereign cannot be sued without its consent.
In retrospect though, it appears that sovereign immunity was interpreted and applied on a case-by-case basis depending on the political circumstances surrounding the case. 127 The Court swung back and forth between finding for bondholders and for states (in the latter case, allowing repudiation and thus arguably sanctioning a constitutional violation), producing a wholly inconsistent body of doctrine. 128 In these cases, the Court "tended to follow practical necessity; the more dire the financial straits [of a state], the more that zero-sum realities compel [led] protection" of the state via sovereign immunity. 129 These precedents suggest that when a government is faced with extraordinary debt demands, the Supreme Court might flexibly interpret the Constitution to suit government needs. 130 Moreover, even if the Supreme Court interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment to require the federal government to print money to avoid default, it is unclear whether the executive branch of the government would have to comply with that order given the Constitution's separation of powers. Further, U.S. presidents have demonstrated a willingness to defy the Supreme Court when they believe necessity demands it.
131 If the executive branch did not comply, the Fourteenth Amendment would prove irrelevant in a practical sense; there would be no money to collect and the plaintiffs would essentially be left only with a judgment in their favor. 1889, 1974 (1983) . In the aftermath of the Civil War, several states moved to repudiate their state debts. Id. Because they may have been willing to ignore Supreme Court interpretations of the Contract Clause that held repudiation to be unconstitutional, the doctrine of sovereign immunity arguably allowed the court to avoid "the humiliation of seeing its political authority compromised." Id. 128 Id. at 1996 (explaining the inconsistencies in how the doctrine of sovereign immunity was applied in various states). Compare Sands v. Edmunds, 116 U.S. 585, 585 (1886) (allowing Virginia officers to be sued to enforce a lawyer's right to pay for his license to practice by using a coupon issued by the state of Virginia), and Poindexter v. 
Procedural Hurdles
Creditors that challenge a U.S. debt default would also face procedural hurdles-including the need to overcome sovereign immunity-to establish a compensable remedy and to enforce any resulting judgment against government assets in the face of executive branch opposition. 134 The first hurdle, sovereign immunity, is theoretically the lowest hurdle because it can be waived if the sovereign unmistakably expresses its intent to do so. 135 Currently, many sovereigns include explicit waivers of immunity in their bonds. 136 The extent to which U.S. debt includes a waiver of sovereign immunity is unclear, though. The statute setting forth procedures for the U.S. government to issue debt securities makes no mention of sovereign immunity, 137 and correspondence with the U.S. Department of the Treasury suggests that U.S. Treasury securities do not include any waivers of sovereign immunity. 138 To the extent that U.S. debt does not include an express contractual waiver of sovereign immunity, creditors might turn to the Tucker Act, which grants jurisdiction in certain courts and waives sovereign immunity for nontort monetary claims. 139 The waiver applies to the federal government's viola- 133 Id. 134 See Sturzenegger & Zettelmeyer, supra note 126, at 11 (explaining that "waivers [of sovereign immunity] are in fact routinely included in bond covenants"). This Article's discussion of procedural hurdles assumes that the default continues long enough for the hurdle to become relevant. For example, if the United States cures a default quickly by paying the amount in arrears, the paid creditor should have no further need to attempt to obtain a judgment against the United States or to enforce any such judgment, if obtained.
135 FALLON ET AL., supra note 126, at 947 (explaining that "courts have generally insisted that a waiver by Congress be unmistakably expressed"). tions of federal statutes, executive regulations, and contracts. 140 Because U.S. debt securities are arguably a form of debt contract, violating their payment terms by defaulting would likely qualify as a contract violation under the Tucker Act.
141 Foreign creditors might also be able to take advantage of international treaties under which the United States has waived its sovereign immunity defense or agreed to arbitration stemming from any debt disputes.
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The second procedural hurdle to challenging a U.S. debt default is establishing a remedy: unless creditors show they are entitled to an enforceable remedy, "there is no right." 143 The Tucker Act requires plaintiffs to "demonstrate that the . . . substantive law relied upon 'can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government for damage sustained.'" 144 The Supreme Court has held that claims based on the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment meet this standard because the clause itself prescribes a remedy: just compensation. 145 Claims based on other constitutional provisions are often rejected, however, because they do not expressly 140 FALLON ET AL., supra note 126, at 961-62 ("The Tucker Act is strictly limited to claims for money."). 141 See id. (explaining that the Tucker Act includes claims based in contract law). 142 See Kevin Gallagher, The New Vulture Culture: Sovereign Debt Restructuring and Trade and Investment Treaties 2 (The IDEAs, Working Paper No. 2/2011, 2011) (explaining that sovereign debt is often an "investment" covered under international investment agreements and arguing that this gives foreign holders of sovereign debt the right to file arbitration claims in accordance with the procedures laid out in such agreements). The U.S. government has effectively provided its consent to be sued under forty-one bilateral investment treaties and several regional treaties, including the North American Fair Trade Agreement and the Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement. E-mail from Julie Maupin, Lecturing Fellow, Ctr. for Int'l and Comparative Law, Duke Law School, to author (Aug. 22, 2013) (on file with the author) (explaining that in these treaties, the United States has consented to arbitrate with foreign investors; that these treaties define "investment" quite broadly to include "bonds"; and that international arbitral tribunals have held that sovereign debt is indeed covered by an investment treaty under this type of broad language); see also Ambiente Ufficio S. provide for a monetary remedy. 146 It is therefore uncertain that creditors asserting a Fourteenth Amendment challenge to a U.S. debt default would clear this hurdle because the Fourteenth Amendment does not explicitly provide for a monetary remedy.
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The last procedural hurdle is enforcing a judgment, if one is actually obtained. For foreign creditors, it is generally difficult to force a reluctant government to pay because most sovereign assets and income streams are located inside the defaulting country. 148 To the extent the United States has assets outside its jurisdictional boundaries, however, foreign creditors might be able to legally seize those assets to pay certain international arbitration awards.
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Even domestic creditors could face enforcement problems. If the federal government defaulted because it did not have funds to pay the debt, the only other source of payment would likely be in the form of non-cash government assets. If these assets were important to government operations, the executive branch would likely try to defy the Court's judgment. the Court if it delivered an unfavorable opinion. 151 In that case, the executive branch of the federal government refused to redeem its bonds in gold, as promised in the bond contracts, arguing that a June 5, 1933 joint resolution of Congress abrogated that promise. 152 The bondholder-plaintiffs claimed that the joint resolution was unconstitutional because it deprived them of property without due process of law. 153 President Roosevelt believed that having to redeem U.S. bonds in gold would lead to economic catastrophe. 154 Anticipating a decision requiring such redemption, Roosevelt drafted a fireside chat, an evening radio address appealing directly to the people, announcing his intention not to comply with the Court's ruling. 155 The basis of his address was a necessity argument, using the Bible and the Golden Rule for support. 156 The address was ultimately unnecessary because the Perry court decided in his favor, but Roosevelt's readiness to defy the Court was clear. 157 Other presidents have shown a similar willingness to defy judicial orders. President Andrew Jackson, for example, reportedly responded to a Supreme Court mandate with the now famous line, "John Marshall has made his decision, now let him enforce it." 158 President Abraham Lincoln followed suit in the 1861 Circuit Court for the District of Maryland case of Ex parte Merryman. 159 In order to protect Washington, D.C. against secessionist forces, Lincoln suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. 160 Chief Justice Roger Taney, then acting as circuit judge, declared the suspension unlawful. 161 Lincoln refused to respect the decision, arguing in part that the President may violate a single law if it is done in order to preserve the Constitution as a whole-in essence, Lincoln was making a necessity argument, not unlike Roosevelt's. 162 Notwithstanding these precedents, it is unclear whether the executive branch has the legal authority to defy orders of the judicial branch. Some argue that the executive branch must comply with such orders. 163 Others contend that each branch of the U.S. government can determine for itself what is constitutional, making judicial rulings not automatically binding on the executive. 164 In the event of a true deadlock between the judicial and executive branches, the ultimate arbiter might end up being the legislative branch, in which case Congress would have to decide whether it is prepared to impeach the President for defying the judicial order. 
Other Legal Consequences
Depending on the contractual terms of particular U.S. debt securities, there might be additional legal consequences. For example, sovereign debt securities sometimes include cross-default clauses, under which a default by the sovereign on virtually any of its debt securities can trigger a default on other debt securities of the sovereign that include a cross-default clause. 166 Investors in those other debt securities can then accelerate the maturities of their debt, even if those other debt securities have been current in payment. 167 As a result, the sovereign can find huge amounts of its debt coming due unexpectedly as a result of its default-possibly even its temporary default-on a relatively small amount of debt. 168 Even if the sovereign subsequently cures 162 Fallon, supra note 158, at 3; Paulsen, supra note 160, at 94; see supra note 156 and accompanying text (explaining President Roosevelt's argument). 163 Fallon, supra note 158, at 11 (calling this the "Pure Judicial Supremacy Model"). 164 Id. at 14 ("According to the Political Constitutional Model, each of the three branches of the national government gets to determine for itself what the Constitution means."). 165 Id. at 22-23 (arguing that Congress would likely impeach the President if he defied a judicial order but that nevertheless the President could decide to "take his or her chances"). 166 Stephen J. Choi et al., The Evolution of Contractual Terms in Sovereign Bonds, J. LEG. ANALYSIS, Spring 2012, at 131, 140 (describing cross-default clauses as a "common method investors [in sovereign bonds] use to protect themselves"). 167 Id. (emphasizing that cross-default clauses "provide that if the sovereign defaults on some of its debt, then that action constitutes a default on other debt even though the sovereign is otherwise current on that debt"). 168 See id. In the author's experience, the ability of creditors to use a cross-default clause to accelerate the maturity of their debt securities depends on the precise terms of the clause. A crossdefault clause may enable acceleration if the default on other debt continues past any applicable grace period or exceeds a minimal threshold amount. See id. at 147 (describing a grace period of thirty days).
that default by paying the amount originally in arrears, 169 that cure would not necessarily rescind the acceleration of the other debt.
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It is unclear whether any U.S. debt securities currently include crossdefault clauses. 171 The statute setting forth procedures for the U.S. government to issue debt securities makes no mention of these types of clauses, 172 thereby leaving their inclusion subject to the discretion of the Secretary of the Treasury. 173 Even if no U.S. debt securities currently include cross-default clauses, such clauses could be included in future issuances of securities, perhaps at the demand of investors.
174 If any U.S. debt securities were to include cross-default clauses, the consequences of a U.S. debt default could be greatly magnified.
B. Economic Consequences
A U.S. debt default 175 would also have both microeconomic and macroeconomic, or systemic, consequences. 176 Observers have argued that a default would likely result in stocks, bonds, and the dollar "plummet [ing] in the im- 169 Cf. supra note 134 and accompanying text (discussing that the United States could cure a default by paying the amount in arrears). 170 This observation is based on the author's experience. Cf. Choi et al., supra note 166, at 147-48 (observing that although acceleration provisions "vary a great deal," the vote of some majority of creditors may be able to "reverse the acceleration"). 171 It is also unclear whether any U.S. debt securities currently allow investors to accelerate the maturities of their debt. If any U.S. debt securities did contain cross-default clauses, however, it would be customary, in the author's experience, for those securities to also allow investors therein to accelerate the maturities of their debt; otherwise, a breach of the cross-default clause would create a right without a remedy. 172 obligations under sections 3102-3104 of this title is final"). 174 Cf. supra note 166 and accompanying text (describing cross-default clauses as a "common method investors [in sovereign bonds] use to protect themselves"). 175 Recall that this Article uses the term "default" to mean a hard default: non-payment of debt when due, or a distressed exchange offer. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 176 Cf. Schwarcz, supra note 99, at 817-18. In a previous article written by this author, I described the difference between microeconomic and macroeconomic consequences:
The primary goal for regulating financial risk is micro-prudential: maximizing economic efficiency within the financial system. Systemic risk is a form of financial risk, so efficiency should certainly be a goal in its regulation. But systemic risk also represents risk to the financial system itself. Any framework for regulating systemic risk therefore should also include that macro-prudential goal: protecting the financial system itself. Id. mediate aftermath." 177 Credit markets would likely freeze, harming both companies and consumers. 178 The downgrading of credit ratings on U.S. debt would also make it much more difficult and expensive for the country to borrow. 179 Even a mere "technical" default, caused by illiquidity, could harm the real economy. 180 The 1979 debt defaults, which were temporarily caused by a federal debt ceiling limit on new borrowings, 181 resulted in a sixty basis point increase in the interest rate on Treasury bills, 182 an increase that might well be permanent. 183 186 At a minimum, the United States would likely see a one percent reduction in gross domestic product due to higher interest rates and a likely equity selloff.
187 Even worse, the report concluded that the default also "could leave lasting damage in its wake due to a permanent decline in foreign demand [for U.S. Treasury securities], which will likely lead to [continuing] higher borrowing costs and larger deficits." ith Treasury yields rising this year, a widening in spreads would lead to an increase in yields on corporate debt," and would similarly "increase mortgage rates, raising the cost of buying a home"). 185 Belton et al., supra note 18, at 1. 186 Id.; see also supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text (observing that even an otherwise temporary U.S. debt default could undermine the nation's perceived creditworthiness, making it more expensive or difficult to borrow in order to repay future maturing debt and therefore increasing rollover risk and potentially triggering a larger debt crisis). The recent Department of Treasury report was even more blunt than this, as it stated that "[i]n the event that a debt limit impasse were to lead to a default, it could have a catastrophic effect on not just financial markets but also on job creation, consumer spending and economic growth . . . ." U.S. DEP'T OF TREAS., supra note 184, at 6. 187 Belton et al., supra note 18, at 6 (suggesting that, aside from gross domestic product "the ultimate damage [to the economy] could be far greater"). 188 Id. at 4; cf. The Mother of All Tail Risks, ECONOMIST, June 25, 2011, at 83, 83-84 (estimating that a temporary U.S. debt default today could cost the U.S. government approximately $86 billion yearly; observing that foreign investors have shown a newfound willingness to diversify their holdings; and discussing indirect effects of a U.S. debt default, such as impairing the use of Treasury securities as collateral in the repo and derivatives markets). The prediction of a permanent decline in foreign demand for U.S. Treasury securities reflects J.P. Morgan's internal research showing that foreign investors would react much more negatively than U.S. domestic investors to a technical default. Belton et al, supra note 18, at 5. would take too long to be effective. 195 A unilateral debt restructuring could be implemented quickly, but it too would likely fail to mitigate consequences because it is tantamount to a default. 196 The analysis also considers a debt bailout, arguing that although the IMF might have the economic wherewithal to bail out the United States, the conditionality imposed by the IMF as a quid pro quo would likely be politically unacceptable to the United States. 197 A. Debt Restructuring A U.S. debt default could be avoided by restructuring the debt prior to actual default, enabling the government to repay the debt as it comes due. 198 The consequences of such a default might also be mitigated if the debt were restructured after default. 199 It is essential that any method of restructuring U.S. debt be speedy. This is because if done to avoid default, the restructuring would have to be in place before the debt matures. 200 And if done to mitigate the consequences of a default, time would be of the essence in order to minimize financial chaos. 201 Debt restructuring therefore could not be a complete solution to rollover risk, especially if the illiquidity is recognized at the last moment, because it is unlikely that it could be completed within the requisite timeframe. 202 In a non-U.S. context, bilateral restructuring of sovereign debt would be an option. 203 But bilateral approaches-meaning debt restructuring that achieves the consent of both the debtor-nation and its creditors-would not necessarily be speedy, nor are they intended to address the uniquely chaotic problem of a U.S. sovereign debt default. 204 The United States could attempt to unilaterally restructure its debt. Argentina unilaterally restructured its debt in 2001, and Russia did it in 1998. 205 But to do so would effectively amount to the United States refusing to pay national debt while dictating to creditors new payment terms. 206 That is close enough to a debt repudiation to be certain to generate numerous Fourteenth Amendment lawsuits. 207 Indeed, any sovereign unilateral debt restructuring tends to generate multiple lawsuits, even absent constitutional issues. 208 A U.S. unilateral debt restructuring would likely also spark the filing of arbitration claims against the United States, under international treaties. 209 Furthermore, unilateral debt restructuring-even if the government merely delays when payments are to be made, as opposed to writing off portions of its debt-is tantamount to a default because creditors are not paid on a timely basis according to their original contractual terms. 210 That could create the same risk of systemic contagion as a default that is not cloaked in debt-restructuring language. 211 Unilateral debt restructurings could also end up being costly to the government imposing them by increasing the price of future borrowing. For example, Argentine sovereign bond spreads rose 6000 basis points after Argentina's 2001 announcement that it would unilaterally restructure its debt. 212 
B. Bailout
By definition, a bailout could mitigate the consequences of a U.S. debt default. But there likely is only one institution that might have the economic wherewithal to bail out the United States: the IMF. 213 Conceived at a United Nations conference at the close of World War II, the IMF was created to foster global economic cooperation and to avoid a repetition of the Great Depression. 214 With 188 member nations, the IMF can help to bail out its members by lending them money. 215 Although these loans historically have gone to developing, rather than developed, countries, 216 nations like Greece, Portugal, and Ireland have recently turned to the IMF for help.
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As a condition of lending, the IMF customarily requires certain reform measures. 218 Such "conditionality" can include, for example, austerity measures such as controlling budget revenues and restructuring the nation's banks. 219 By accepting IMF money with its conditionality, a country thus for-feits a measure of control over its economy. 220 Politically, it is far from clear that the United States would accept that, even if faced with default. 221 If, however, the IMF were to offer a bailout that the United States accepts, it could help to alleviate U.S. debt problems. 222 If the bailout occurs quickly enough, it could help prevent the debt default; and even if a default occurs, a bailout could provide the United States with stability 223 by allowing it to pay its defaulted creditors. 224 In addition, the announcement of a bailout tends to positively affect domestic stock prices, possibly reducing the threat posed by systemic risk. 225 If the terms of an IMF bailout were more lenient, 226 it might also provide the United States with an opportunity to improve its long-term ability to service debts; and a decrease in the debt burden would free financial resources for things like structural reforms. 227 Despite its potential benefits, any IMF bailout of U.S. debt would not be problem-free. 228 For example, it likely would further increase the risk of moral hazard; if the IMF helps to defray U.S. debt, virtually all IMF member nations might expect IMF protection against default, reducing their incentives to make prudent economic decisions. 229 In the same vein, creditors who anticipate such protection will have more incentive to take unwarranted financial risks when lending to IMF member nations. 230 Austerity measures can also backfire. 231 Recently, the IMF admitted it made mistakes when imposing conditionality on Greece, both underestimating the costs and not foreseeing the harm to the Greek economy of its austerity measures. 232 
CONCLUSION
It is unlikely, at least in the foreseeable future, that the United States will default on its national debt due to insolvency, but its "rollover risk" -the risk that the government will become temporarily illiquid and unable to borrow sufficient funds to repay its debt-is real. The U.S. government's heavy reliance on short-term, frequently maturing debt aggravates the problem, as does the ongoing political dispute over the federal debt ceiling, which limits the amount of new debt that can be issued to repay maturing debt. Yet the harm caused by a U.S. debt default, even if the default is temporary, could be devastating. It would raise government borrowing costs, not only for the United States but for nations worldwide. It would almost certainly have severe systemic consequences, causing financial markets to plummet and credit markets to freeze, and in turn making it difficult for companies to borrow.
Such a default would also likely attract numerous lawsuits, raising legal issues of first impression. The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Con-stitution, for example, makes it illegal for the federal government to renege on its debt. If the government lacks money to pay the debt on a timely basis, would the default be unconstitutional? Creditors challenging a U.S. debt default would also face several complex procedural legal hurdles, including the need to overcome sovereign immunity, to establish a compensable remedy, and to enforce any resulting judgment against government assets in the face of executive branch opposition.
Given the consequences of default, the government should focus more on the goal of managing its rollover risk. Ironically, the primary goal of U.S. debt issuance traditionally has been minimizing the cost of debt issuance; but that goal motivates the increasing use of short-term debt, which in turn increases rollover risk. The government must try to balance these conflicting goals.
The government should also examine how it could address defaults that otherwise would result from rollover risk. As this Article has shown, it has considerable, though not unlimited, flexibility to do that, including by "monetizing" its debt and printing money to pay maturing debt. But these responses could be costly, at the very least sparking inflation. Moreover, the government's flexibility to print money to avoid default could change in the future if the dollar loses its role as the international reserve currency.
Rollover risk could also be managed by restructuring debt prior to actual default. But bilateral debt restructuring, with the consent of both the government and its creditors, might not always be feasible in time to avoid default; whereas a unilateral debt restructuring would be tantamount to a default because creditors would not be paid on a timely basis according to their original contract terms. A bailout is also unlikely. Only the IMF might have the economic wherewithal to bail out the United States; but even if otherwise feasible, an IMF bailout might not be politically acceptable if (as almost certainly would be the case) it is conditioned on IMF-imposed austerity measures.
Bottom line: there is no magic bullet to put an end to rollover risk. Realistic self-imposed measures of governmental austerity, as well as controls on the issuance of new short-term debt, will likely be needed. As a prominent (and savvy) bankruptcy expert has observed:
The lesson for the United States is at once blindingly obvious and one that none of us wants to hear. Either revenue (taxes) must continue to grow or the cost of government services and benefits, and other national financial commitments, must be reduced . . . . Find-ing clever ways to address the nation's existing public debt simply will not solve the problem. 233 The critical question is whether the United States has the political will and integrity to better manage its debt and rollover risk, before it defaults. 234 The world is waiting for the answer.
